Re Rebholz et Ux

• Jurisdiction: Holanda
• Docket Number: Case No. 65
• Date: 22 Enero 1951
• Court: Obsolete Court (Netherlands)

Holland, Council for the Restoration of Legal Rights (Judicial Division),1 Amsterdam.

Case No. 65

In re Rebholz et Ux.

Nationality — Loss of — Naturalization — Re-Naturalization — Force majeure — Enemy Character of Property resulting from Enemy Naturalization of Owner.

The Facts.—Rebholz, a German national by birth, was naturalized in the Netherlands on December 30, 1932. During the German occupation of Holland he and his wife again became Germans, through Rückbürgerung (re-naturalization) on March 6, 1943. They consequently lost their Netherlands nationality under Article 7 of the Dutch Law on Citizenship of 1892. But on June 5, 1943, an Emergency Decree (Staatsblad No. D 16) was enacted by the Netherlands Government in London which provided that Netherlands subjects

who had become German citizens during the war would nevertheless, as an exception from the general rule of the said Article 7, retain their Netherlands citizenship. (The intention of this provision was to prevent such persons from escaping punishment in Holland for any treacherous behaviour during the war.) Thus, from that date Rebholz and his wife were possessed of dual nationality. Under a later Decree of October 20, 1944 (No. E 133), their property became enemy property and as such liable to appropriation by the State of the Netherlands for the purposes of reparations. Rebholz and his wife claimed to be relieved from the effects of this measure on the grounds (a) that the Decree on Enemy Property was intended to apply only to those German nationals who did not possess at the same time Netherlands nationality, and (b) that in any case they had been re-naturalized through force majeure and therefore their German citizenship should not be regarded as a ground for the appropriation of their property

Held: that the claims must be dismissed and the claimants deemed to be German for the purpose of Decree No. E 133. With regard to the first ground of appeal, the Decree contained no such restriction as was contended for by the plaintiffs. It provided that certain legal disabilities should result from the tact of a person having been an...